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The 1857-59 Indian Uprising was a cataclysmic event in the history of the British 
Empire in India and would witness monumental and shocking scenes of violence on 
both sides of the conflict. The Uprising has become something much debated and 
discussed within Indian and British history, and an exploration of the fundamental 
brutality of the conflict, albeit in this case on the British side, is an important element 
of better understanding such an important historical event. This article therefore 
explores the British Army's use of violence against Indian Sepoys and ordinary 
civilians during the Uprising and works to explore as to whether this approached 
something akin to a genocide, as has previously been suggested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. ‘Blowing from Guns in British India’ source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vereshchagin-Blowing_from_Guns_in_British_India.jpg
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Introduction 
he Indian Uprising of 1857-59 has 
cast its place in history as one of the 
most infamous conflicts to take place 
in the British Empire. India was the crown 
jewel of the Empire and maintained by the rule 
of the East India Company (EIC), a vast British 
trading organisation that had managed to 
monopolise trade between Europe and the 
Southern Asian subcontinent effectively from 
1757. The Uprising, beginning with a mutiny 
of the Sepoys at the Meerut barracks of the 
Bengal Army in May 1857 and spreading 
throughout other regiments of the Indian Army 
and into the wider population until its official 
end in April 1859, shook the Empire to its core. 
The rebellion would pave the way for almost a 
century of direct rule by the British Crown who 
assumed control in 1858. The 1857 conflict 
itself was ferocious and by no means short of 
accounts of atrocities committed by both sides. 
The rebels would commit appalling acts of 
violence against Europeans, and the British 
army’s mission to control and suppress the 
Uprising was, as Rudrangshu Mukherjee 
asserted, ‘marked by scenes of violence quite 
unparalleled in the history of British rule in 
India.’1 The British public, feasting on 
narratives of barbaric slaughter of Europeans in 
the London Times and other national media 
                                                 
1 Mukherjee, R.“Satan Let Loose Upon the Earth” The 
Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857’ Past 
and Present, vol.128, no.1, 1990, p.93 
outlets, were provided with a plethora of 
evidence to confirm what they had long 
suspected the ‘savage’ Indian race to be 
capable of at their basest moments. It was this 
particular portrayal of the natives that led to 
cries for vengeance across Britain by the public 
and the press, this call to arms being met by 
British forces in a severe fashion. 
The considerably vicious nature of the 
rebellion’s counterinsurgency has led to 
suggestions that the violence committed by the 
British was greater than routine suppression, 
and instead took on a more grotesque form of 
violent reaction, possibly even genocide. Most 
notably this accusation has been levelled by 
Indian writer and historian Amaresh Misra, 
who challenges the common consensus that the 
numbers of deaths of Indians throughout the 
course of the Uprising amounted to no more 
than around one hundred thousand, and instead 
argues that the conflict lasted over a decade 
and resulted in what he has described publicly 
as a ‘Holocaust, one where millions 
disappeared…’2 Misra claims that the British 
saw this as a ‘necessary Holocaust’ and cites 
British labour records in India that show large 
discrepancies in manpower across the 
subcontinent pre and post the Uprising as being 
evidence for the huge numbers of fatalities, 
even ranging into the millions, that supposedly
                                                 
2 Misra, A. in The Guardian, Friday 24 August 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/24/india.ran
deepramesh 
T 
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occurred.3 In Misra’s view, the British army’s 
reaction to the 1857 Uprising was akin to an 
act of genocide, hence the reference to the 
Holocaust, a term unusual when utilised 
outside of its original context of violent anti-
Semitism throughout 1933-45 Nazi Germany 
and the horrors of the attempted extermination 
of the Jewish people in Europe. Although 
Misra’s sources of evidence and statistical data 
for the main line of his argument have been 
questioned by historians versed in the topic, it 
is not the aim of this debate to query the 
numbers of those killed by the British in order 
to take issue with the idea of ‘genocide’. The 
debate shall instead examine the motives of the 
British soldiers and officers for exacting the 
extensive nature of the Uprising’s violence, 
demonstrated in their methods and reasoning 
throughout the conflict. The problem with 
basing an accusation largely upon statistical 
data, i.e., the numbers of those killed, is that it 
muddies the terminology surrounding the 
notion of genocide. A statistical approach 
therefore does not largely take into account 
motivational reasoning for widespread colonial 
violence during the Uprising, which is arguably 
where the real application of the term genocide 
should be tested. 
The difficulties that immediately arise 
from such an accusation stem from the 
complexities surrounding the phrase, as 
                                                 
3 Ibid 
differing interpretations of what this word 
actually embodies are numerous. Genocide, 
although the term was coined by Raphael 
Lemkin in 1943/44, was by no means a 
twentieth-century phenomenon, but in wake of 
the Holocaust the postwar world was perhaps 
in need of a more extensive expression to 
define slaughter on such a monumental scale 
and for such specific reasoning. To reach this 
expression, Lemkin had combined the Greek 
genos meaning ‘race’ and the Latin suffix –
cide for ‘kill’.4 The UN Resolution of 1946 
then would expand upon this and defined 
genocide in international law as ‘the denial of 
the right of existence of entire human groups.’5 
The idea of genocide as the elimination, partial 
or in whole, of human groups has pervaded 
much of the understanding of what the term 
means in both academic and popular form. 
However, Martin Shaw has asserted that the 
use of the word has become too common, as 
allegations of genocide are made often freely to 
describe a situation where a certain volume of 
killing has occurred, this blurring an accurate 
definition or useful application of the term.6 
One may question therefore as to whether an 
accusation of genocide in reference to the 
British counterinsurgency in 1857 is also a case 
of this misuse. Genocide, in a legal sense, must
                                                 
4 S. Totten & P. Bartrop (eds.), The Genocide Studies 
Reader, London, Routledge, 2009, p.4 
5 Ibid 
6 M. Shaw What is Genocide? Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2007, p.3 
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go beyond the categories for standard murder 
of mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus 
(guilty act), but also compose of a third 
element: dolus specialis – the existence of 
special intent to destroy a group, in part or in 
whole.7 This is also sometimes referred to as 
‘specific intent’, denoting the idea that the 
intention to kill has a particular target, though 
notably this is largely interchangeable with the 
former term and is a legal scruple if anything.8 
In terms of the ‘group’ that the definition refers 
to, this has usually been exemplified in ethnic, 
religious or political means, i.e., the mass 
murder of Muslims due to their religion, hence 
‘group’, could warrant the claim of genocide. 
Genocide in practice may appear to have a 
multitude of origins leading to its employment, 
however dolus specialis must arguably be 
demonstrated along either ethnic, political, or 
religious lines, as well as other cases of a 
persecution of pre-determined groups9, to 
determine a feasible application of the term.  
The notion of genocide therefore contends 
that a people is physically persecuted due to 
their being of a particular defined grouping; 
however, it is also important in terms of the 
purpose of this debate to establish genocide’s 
distinction from massacre, as both have traits 
                                                 
7 O. Triffterer (2001). ‘Genocide, Its Particular Intent to 
Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such’ Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol.14, p.400 
8 W. A. Schabas (2001). The Jelisic Case and the Mens 
Rea of the Crime of Genocide. Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol.14, p.129 
9 E.g. Gender, Age, Sexuality or political class 
of extreme violence but each contains a vital 
difference in their manifestations. Jacques 
Semelin has begun the definition of massacre 
as a form of collective action aimed at the 
elimination of civilians, mostly non-
combatants, as an act or extension of war.10 
Massacre, therefore, though aimed at a certain 
people, is not necessarily ethnically, religiously 
or politically defined, and thus differentiates 
itself from genocide. Furthermore, Semelin 
also argues that massacre is employed for 
partial destruction with the intention of having 
an impact on the whole community 
psychologically; in other words the spread of 
terror amongst the survivors of such a 
traumatic event can therefore achieve the 
desired effect without the need for complete 
extermination.11 The aspect that also blurs the 
distinction between genocide and massacre, 
and something that is central to our discussion, 
is warfare, and as Adam Jones put it, ‘war and 
genocide are the Siamese twins of history.’12 
Jones sees war as setting ample conditions for 
genocide as the environment where violence is 
heightened and legalities are worn can lead to 
mass violence being inflicted upon groups, 
particularly in the case where war is fought 
along ethnic, religious or political divides.13 
The actions of war can be smoke-screened
                                                 
10 J. Semelin, in Genocide Studies Reader, p.86  
11 Ibid. p.88 
12 A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction 
(London: Routledge) 2006, p.48 
13 Ibid, p.49 
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behind a veil of circumstantial necessities, 
though in reality they are arguably little 
different than acts of genocide. The blood lust 
that is expedited by war, replacing rational 
psychological and emotional states, can be thus 
channelled into persecution of particular 
groups.14 However, in situations where racial 
and religious divisions do exist within a 
warfare environment, the act of massacre may 
still be the case due to the heightened sense of 
violence and the desire to escalate the ferocity 
of the conflict in order to have a devastating 
psychological effect, as Semelin’s contention 
suggests. This therefore is not necessarily 
genocide as the ‘special intent’ is absent. What 
is clear is that the notions of genocide and 
massacre are a historical and sociological grey 
area. For the sake of argument, and in order to 
help provide a functioning definition in order 
to facilitate an analysis of the British reaction 
in 1857, genocide in this instance shall be 
understood according to the existence of the 
dolus specialis – the violent persecution of a 
group due to their ethnicity, religion or 
political leanings. Massacre shall also therefore 
be defined as likewise a violent action against a 
mass of people, but without the attachment of a 
special intention to persecute a particular 
group. 
In light of a brief, but important, 
exploration of the meanings of genocide and 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
massacre, and an academic construction of a 
working definition for each term, this paper 
therefore shall focus on the lengths to which 
the British forces went to quash the Uprising 
and their motivations in doing so, before 
coming to a conclusion as to whether the 
British soldiers and officers embarked upon 
genocide or if an alternative conclusion can 
instead be drawn from the evidence. In order to 
provide a thorough evaluation of this debate, 
this paper shall be divided into three sections 
of theoretical and empirical analysis followed 
by a final conclusive section. The first section 
shall explore the foundations of colonial 
authority and its relationship to violence during 
the Empire, providing a contextual basis 
around which the British reaction in 1857 can 
be better understood in the wider sphere of 
British imperialism and its forms of authority. 
The second section will then begin to examine 
the primary material regarding the British 
tactics and treatment of the natives during the 
counterinsurgency. An investigation of the 
manifestations of colonial violence during the 
Uprising will be useful in gauging the extent of 
the suppression and hope to shed some light on 
how it became such a brutal conflict. The third 
section will then provide an analysis of the 
racial, religious or other motivations of the 
British soldiers in order to search for a direct 
dolus specialis, measuring to what extent this 
was a violent persecution of a group on 
prejudicial grounds, or driven by other factors.
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Finally, a concluding section will hope to draw 
upon the themes and complexities of the debate 
and deliver a weighted opinion on whether 
there are grounds for an accusation of genocide 
against the British forces in the Uprising.  The 
empirical material shall be drawn from the 
journals, diaries, memoirs and anecdotes of 
British officers and soldiers who fought in the 
Uprising, as well as those of non-combatants. 
Unfortunately, the period offers little in the 
way of Indian primary sources due to the 
illiteracy of many of the Sepoys and natives. 
However, the candour of the British troops and 
non-combatants, whom as the following will 
demonstrate held few reservations in exposing 
what took place during the counterinsurgency, 
provides us with a wealth of material with 
which to explore the theme. Alongside primary 
accounts and secondary literature, in order to 
form a theoretical understanding of British 
colonialist coercion, arguments have been 
drawn from a number of sources including 
historians and sociologists versed in the 
background of sovereign authority and imperial 
studies. This paper shall therefore explore and 
try to conclude on to whether the British 
response to the Uprising could arguably be 
described as colonial genocide, or whether 
other explanations in light of a thorough 
evaluation of alternative motives for violent 
suppression can provide a more accurate 
analysis.  
The Empire and Authority 
The British Empire: Authority and Violence 
Considering the historiographical aspect of the 
rebellion and its relationship to imperial studies 
in general, the Uprising has produced a vast 
library of interpretations surrounding the 
origins, events, and the aftermath of what such 
a short-lived conflict. In India, historians such 
as V.D. Savarkar and S.B. Chaudhuri have 
drummed up a wave of nationalist 
historiography by trying to depict the Uprising 
as the First Independence War of India. 
Chaudhuri has asserted that the fact that 1857 
was a rebellion under a nationalist cause with 
an alliance of an anti-colonial ideology.15 This 
however is a fairly teleological approach to the 
conflict and possibly a forced attempt to fit the 
event into a general narrative of the fight for 
Indian independence. British imperialist 
historians on the other hand have often sought 
to try and move on from the rebellion in a swift 
fashion and exonerate the British from much of 
the wrongdoing in both the causes of the 
conflict and their conduct throughout.16 This 
involved a post-pacification process that 
established the event as a ‘mutiny’, therefore 
confining it to the realms of the army and not 
the wider population, and also related the crisis 
to the grievances of the Sepoys related to the
                                                 
15 S. B. Chaudhuri, Theories of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-
59: a study of the views of an eminent historian on the 
subject, Calcutta, World Press, 1965, p.1 
16 C. Bates, Subalterns and Raj: South Asia Since 1600, 
London, Routledge, 2007, p.57 
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pig greased rifle ammunition.17 This possibly 
was an effort to trivialise the causes of the 
rebellion and an attempt to confine its roots to 
the complexities of Oriental religions, mostly 
alien to most British people at the time. The 
trend within the British historiography of the 
Uprising to try and remove Company 
culpability and focus on moving onwards from 
the event has also been evident in the general 
imperialist historiography of the Empire as a 
whole. Some historians, possibly unwilling to 
confront the more uncomfortable elements of 
the British imperial past, have sought to 
exemplify the perceived good that the empire 
achieved such as the building of trade networks 
and export of European ‘civilised’ culture. 
Recently however, revisionists, such as 
Richard Gott, have argued that the British 
Empire was a rather more conquest-hungry 
enterprise that relied on rule by force and the 
subjugation of subaltern classes in order for it 
to survive.18 There is also a suggestion that the 
Empire was largely a military operation 
invariably tied in with supporting and aiding 
the expanding trade monopolies, suggesting 
that British soldiers were often mercenaries for 
imposing authority and this legionnaire 
                                                 
17 The pig greased cartridges had to be bitten in order to 
load them into the barrel and thus the pork fat betrayed 
the Indian soldier’s caste, which was reputedly one of 
the Sepoy’s many grievances. Bates, Subalterns and Raj, 
p.65 
18 R. Gott, Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and 
Revolt, London, Verso Books, 2011, p3 
approach could have contributed to a lack of 
professionalism in colonial conflicts.19 
Alongside the use of British armed forces 
as guardians of a growing trade monopoly, due 
to finite numbers of British soldiers, the 
colonised often became the colonisers per say, 
as natives were recruited as police and soldiers 
throughout the colonies.20 The reliance in India 
on natives to impose authority upon other 
Indians is just one of the numerous 
contradictions that the Empire managed to 
conjure up during its reign.21 It is in one these 
instances that one can gain some insight into 
some of the authoritative methods of the 
colonial administration. A report 
commissioned in 1854 in India illuminated 
some of the practices of the colonial authorities 
when an investigation was launched regarding 
the supposed use of torture by native police, 
who were apparently utilising this method in 
order to gain revenue payments from locals in 
the Madras area. The report acknowledged 
that, ‘The universal existence of torture as a 
financial institution of British India is thus 
officially admitted,’ however the head which 
upon the blame lay was passed over to ‘unruly’ 
lower Hindu officials.22 The use of torture as a
                                                 
19 Ibid, p.1-2 
20 Ibid 
21 G. Rand ‘Martial races’ and ‘imperial subjects’: 
Violence and Governance in Colonial India, 1857–
1914. European Review of History 2006, vol.13, no.1, 
p.15 
22 K. Marx & F. Engels, Investigation of Tortures in 
India in On Colonialism, Moscow, Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1960, p.136 
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mode of colonial authority, despite in this 
instance being blamed on native police, was 
arguably a characteristic of British rule in India 
and possibly across the Empire. The pervasion 
of torture into methods of colonial authority 
was evident in India, but in terms of capital 
punishment it was the act of hanging that 
would become such an integral part of the 
British Empire’s modus operandi when 
challenged with dissidence. As David 
Andersen has asserted, the ‘rope, the noose, 
and the drop’ have always fascinated the 
British public who ‘always liked a good 
hanging’.23 This would certainly seem the case 
in the British colonies and an interesting point 
to note, and one central to this debate, is that 
whilst execution by public hanging in Britain 
and in other European states would recede by 
the later eighteenth century, in the colonies it 
continued to be a visual affair. As Michel 
Foucault has explored, the results of the 
reformation of legal and penal systems in 
Europe led to the dying out of the events that 
have been described as ‘festival of 
punishments’, where crowds would swarm to 
watch the public execution of criminals and 
political dissidents.24 In Foucault’s view, this 
was an important departure from the more 
medieval methods of public execution and 
                                                 
23 D. Andersen, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s dirty 
war in Kenya and the end of empire, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2005, p6 
24 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London: Allen 
Lane) 1977, pp.8-14 
punishment and to a modernising sphere of 
state retribution, as it left ‘the domain of 
everyday perception and entering that of 
abstract consciousness’ and achieved 
‘effectiveness from inevitability not visible 
intensity’.25 The sense that the most effective 
deterrent was not the spectacle of punishment 
but instead what the imagination would have to 
perceive it to be was a powerful instrument in 
nineteenth century Britain. The threat of 
execution remained, however a graphic 
reminder was unnecessary.  
Mass public execution in the British 
colonies during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries would not follow the line of Europe 
and begin to execute behind closed doors, 
instead keeping this tradition on display, often 
as an example of colonial supremacy. What 
this also possibly suggests is that the colonials 
considered themselves to be outside of the 
normal confines of European society when it 
came to enforcing authority. Hannah Arendt 
has described the British colonists’ experience 
of the ‘Dark Continent’ of Africa as a place far 
removed from Europe and ‘A world of native 
savages was a perfect setting for men who had 
escaped the reality of civilization’.26 The 
account of The Times Special Correspondent 
during 1857, William Russell, concurs, as he 
exclaims during his journal of the Uprising, ‘I
                                                 
25 Ibid, p.9 
26 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, London, 
World Publishing Company, 1961, p.190 
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believe we permit things to be done in India 
which we would not permit to be done in 
Europe, or could not hope to effect without 
public reprobation’27 Linked to this is the 
argument that the colonials’ knowledge of the 
inequalities of the pseudo-rule of law in 
colonial India could have also encouraged a 
violent approach to the treatment of Indians. 
As Elizabeth Kolsky has asserted, the colonials 
in practice often rejected the British extension 
of the rule of law that they so famously upheld 
at home.28 Opposition arose to trials by native 
judges and juries, possibly leading to a sense of 
having few legal restrictions upon British 
conduct in India.29 Private Metcalfe 
demonstrates an example of this in his diary of 
1857, as he records how he was excused 
punishment for beating a native, ‘Consequently 
I gave him a straight one from the shoulder. 
The commanding officer asked who was by at 
the time and my comrade corroborated my 
statement. He then asked the native if it was I 
who struck him, and he answered in the 
affirmative, and the verdict was – Serve you 
right.’30 Legal inequality was underlined by 
increasingly racist and superior attitudes 
towards the Indians in the 19th century, and 
thus the idea of one law for Europeans and 
                                                 
27 W. Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, New York, 
Klaus Reprint Co, 1957, p.114 
28 E. Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 106 
29 Ibid pp. 230-231 
30 H. Metcalfe, The Chronicle of Private Henry Metcalfe, 
London, Cassell, 1953, p.21 
another for natives, would arguably be a 
central aspect of colonial authority throughout 
India.  
The feeling of liberation outside of the 
confines of Europe makes an interesting 
argument for the pervasion of public and 
wanton violence in the colonies, as does the 
idea that the colonials were aware of their 
relative protection from judicial punishment 
due to an unequal rule of law. Another 
explanation for this trend of martial authority 
and extent of capital punishment seen in the 
colonies could also possibly have been 
influenced by what has been described as the 
insecurity of the British Empire. Revisionists 
have expressed the idea that the British 
colonial experience was fraught with fear of 
usurpation by those who they had given power 
to in order to help police the colonies.31 In 
order to quell dissent therefore, a visual 
demonstration of authority was necessary and 
during the Uprising, graphic punishment would 
arguably be key to British strategy. Bernard 
Cohn has argued colonial authority had to be 
displayed by the British in India during 1857 in 
demonstrative form in order to maintain the 
subjugation of the natives and thus British 
hegemony.32 In the aftermath of the Uprising a 
codified rule of authority was created with the
                                                 
31 C. Bates, Subalterns and Raj, p.56 
32 B. S. Cohn, ‘Representing Authority in Victorian 
India’ in The Invention of Tradition, E. Hobsbawm and 
T. Ranger (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, p.165 
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British Crown assuming the role of governing 
India, however, until this point, authority lay 
solely with the EIC and the British army, and 
their ability to suppress subversion.33 Periods 
of mass capital punishment, as seen in 1857 
would re-occur, particularly in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century and early half of the 
twentieth century. This was arguably when the 
heyday of the British Empire began to falter 
and as Arendt has argued, decolonisation often 
runs parallel to instances of massacre.34 The era 
of British colonial history that draws many a 
parallel with 1857 was the British reaction to 
the Kenyan Mau Mau insurgency in the 1950s. 
This was one of the most violent episodes in 
British imperial history with the state execution 
of over one thousand Kenyans by hanging, the 
internment of an estimated 1.5 million in 
concentration camps and a brutal military 
campaign fought against the insurgents in the 
jungles that saw the indiscriminate killing of 
rural peoples.35 The methods employed by 
colonial forces throughout the insurgency 
would mirror those of 1857, being designed to 
strike fear into the population. Being careful to 
avoid teleology, parallels drawn with 1857 are 
perhaps unmistakable in Kenya, with 
executions carried out on scant evidence and 
capital punishment in abundance. The events of 
                                                 
33 Ibid, p.164 
34 H. Arendt, On Violence, New York, Harcourt, Brace 
Jovanovich, 1970, p.53 
35 C. Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The brutal end of Empire, 
London, Jonathon Cape, 2005, p.xiii. 
the 1950s in Kenya, alongside those in 1857, 
demonstrate how when the British Empire was 
confronted this often led to violent reprisals, 
ending in mass capital punishment to make an 
example of those who dare challenge colonial 
authority. The basis of colonial supremacy 
being directly related to displays of violence 
would arguably provide impetus for the 
implementation of counterinsurgency tactics 
during 1857 that extended this approach to 
dissidence, resulting in the escalation of 
violence as a means of showcasing colonial 
authority. Thus what we must now turn our 
attention to is the British army’s tactics during 
the Uprising and the manifestations of colonial 
violence that have led to such accusations as 
genocide. 
 
Shock and Awe 
The discussion thus far has explored how in the 
colonies capital punishment was often used en 
masse when the Empire was threatened, and in 
general colonial violence was demonstrated 
publicly, even when this trend would begin to 
die out back in Britain. Violence as an 
instrument of the colonial state was arguably 
an integral part of the British Empire and as 
Gyan Prakash asserts, it was, ‘the praxis for 
colonial governance’ in India.36 Even Warren 
Hastings, the first Governor-General of India, 
admitted that in his opinion ‘the sword was the
                                                 
36 G. Prakash in G. Rand, Martial Subjects, p.1 
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only validity to title that the British had in 
India.’37 Hastings’ ‘sword’ during the 
Uprising’s counterinsurgency was the use of 
what can be described as ‘shock and awe’, a 
tactic whereby immense military suppression 
vastly overwhelmed the rebellion and thus 
aimed to put an end to the conflict by 
escalating violence to a level that would have a 
demoralising effect upon the population. 
During the Uprising, this tactic was employed 
by the British who displayed acts of coercion 
openly to Indian civilians and Sepoys. The idea 
was not to weed out the guilty parties, but 
instead employ a sufficient amount of 
intimidation in order to literally ‘shock’ and 
‘awe’ the population into submission. As John 
Lawrence, the Governor of the Punjab at the 
time of the rebellion, put it, ‘Our object is to 
make an example and terrify others.’38 There is 
a case to make that it was this approach that 
perhaps led to such a degree of violence and 
the volume of casualties during the rebellion, 
however it is important to establish exactly 
what this tactic embodied and how it was 
utilised throughout colonial India. 
 
‘Shock and Awe’ throughout British Imperial 
history in India 
The implementation of shock and awe was a 
method by which order could be, perceivably, 
re-established through the use of extreme 
                                                 
37 R. Mukherjee, Satan Let Loose, p.93 
38 Gov. John Lawrence in Ibid, p.112 
violence to produce a demoralising effect on 
the enemy. This technique though was not 
unique to 1857 in India, as the British response 
to the independence campaigns of the first half 
of the twentieth century would go a long way 
to invest belief in this tactic. In reaction to 
growing agitation during the 1916-19 period, 
British forces in India had embarked on a 
coercive campaign in India, burning villages to 
the ground, carrying out aerial bombardments 
on towns, flogging suspected dissidents in 
public and imposing curfews.39 One incident 
that stands out from the period was the 
Jallianwala Bagh episode of 1919 in Amritsar. 
This was particularly extreme as what had 
started as a peaceful protest during a market 
against the recently introduced Rowlatt Act, 
which had maintained wartime emergency 
measures such as the right to imprison without 
trial, became the site of a massacre. A British 
officer, General Dyer, ordered his squadron of 
troops to fire indiscriminately upon the Indians 
in the square. Victims were unable to flee due 
to the army’s blocking of the only exit and 
accounts detail no warning or order to disperse 
before troops were told to commence firing.40 
General Dyer’s response in his statement to an 
investigative panel exploring the event was 
callous, 
I fired and continue to fire until the crowd 
dispersed, and I considered this the least
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amount of firing which would produce the 
necessary moral and widespread effect it 
was my duty to produce if I was to justify 
my action… It was no longer a question of 
merely dispersing the crowd, but one of 
producing a sufficient moral effect from a 
military point of view, not only on those 
present but more specifically throughout 
the Punjab. There could be no question of 
undue severity.41 
 
Dyer’s actions were infamous throughout 
the Empire and beyond and demonstrated a 
clear display of physical intimidation upon the 
Indian population, something Nigel Collett has 
argued was Dyer’s intention before he set out 
to the Bagh that day, wishing to, ‘make a 
demonstration of strength’ to the natives by 
raising ‘the level of violence to a mark 
sufficient to put a stop to the conspiracy’, 
which was explicitly the aim of the ‘shock and 
awe’ method.42 Jallianwalla Bagh was another 
dark period of imperialism in India, however 
the British reaction to the Indian Uprising of 
1857 had previously employed this approach 
on a vast scale.  
 
Capital punishment during the Uprising 
Establishing a ‘sufficient moral effect’, as 
General Dyer would dub it in 1919, was 
arguably the central part of the British 
suppression of the 1857 rebellion. The British 
response therefore became centred upon a 
mixture of public capital punishments and 
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indiscriminate killing during the raids of 
villages and towns, or on marches to captured 
cities. Execution was the fate for many of those 
caught by the British, and Fred Roberts’ letters 
provide us with one of the methods that 
became an integral element of the British 
counterinsurgency tactics during the conflict: 
‘blowing from the gun’. This entailed 
suspected rebels being strapped to the mouth of 
a cannon and then literally blown apart by the 
grape shot, a shocking spectacle for anyone to 
behold. Roberts describing it as ‘a rather 
horrible sight’ but ‘in these times we cannot be 
particular,’ telling of the officers’ views on 
how to conduct during such a brutal conflict.43 
Wilberforce - an officer who wrote of his 
march to and storming of Delhi – also provides 
a more detailed account of this method, ‘A 
hollow square was formed by nine guns on one 
face, the 35th Infantry [who had rebelled]… 
were drawn up opposite facing the guns… the 
next instant their heads flew up into the air, 
their legs fell forward, and their intestines were 
blown into the faces of their former comrades 
who stood watching the scene.’44 The aim was 
twofold: firstly it sprayed those watching with 
the blood and gore of either their friends or 
fellow countrymen, and secondly it denied the
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victim the chance of a proper burial as the body 
could not be cremated, central to Muslim 
belief. Watching this would have been a 
horrifying experience for natives, in both the 
sense of its revolting nature but also its 
religious implications. The British would use 
this method for some time during the rebellion, 
until the latter months of the suppression when 
ammunition was scarce.45  Its usage 
exemplifies how the public display of 
punishment was believed to have been an 
effective form of retribution when dealing with 
a rebellious colony. 
The tactic of ‘blowing from the gun’ was 
used not for convenience but instead for 
achieving a shocking effect, but when 
efficiency was necessary hanging was more 
commonly utilised, as demonstrated in 
Russell’s diary as in one incident a Company 
official exclaims that, ‘he had hanged fifty-four 
men in a few hours for plundering a village.’46 
General Havelock concurs and comments on 
the subsequent effect, stating that ‘the 
unrestrained use of the gallows, struck terror 
into the malcontents.’47 Much improvisation 
was used to carry out these mass executions, as 
one account records, in the event of an absence 
of gallows by which to hang prisoners, the 
officers ordered there to be ‘mango trees for 
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gibbets and elephants for drops.’48 The 
desperation to carry out a public charade of 
hanging suspected rebels, to such an extent that 
even a Company elephant was used, possibly 
demonstrates the importance of showmanship 
of authority to the colonials as well as the 
extent of the numbers of those that were 
executed. These executions were greeted with 
support in Britain and were fully endorsed by 
the press, one example from an excerpt in The 
London Times reads, ‘The effect of a summary 
execution would have been equal to another 
victory. Every tree and gable-end should have 
its burden in the shape of a mutineer’s 
carcass.’49 From the sources it also seems that 
those hung were often not just confirmed rebels 
but any captured or suspected. The 
confirmation of guilt was rarely conducted 
within a formal setting but often on the spot. 
As a soldier quoted in Marx’s letters, ‘Not a 
day passes but we string up from ten to fifteen 
of them’ and another, ‘We hold court-martials 
on horseback, and every nigger we meet with 
we either string up or shoot.’50 The validity of 
guilt on the part of the suspect was irrefutably 
debatable and one could suggest that many of 
those executed for the crime of being a rebel 
may well have not been guilty. The prevalence 
of executing individuals on only a whisper of
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evidence arguably became a characteristic of 
the British reaction.  
 
Indiscriminate killing 
If the capital execution of suspected rebels 
occurred without a firm conviction of guilt and 
in the corrupt court of a horseback judge, then 
one could suggest that the violence of the 
counterinsurgency in general would take on a 
largely arbitrary form. To understand the 
nature of indiscriminate killing however, one 
also has to take into account the nature of the 
battles during the Uprising and how these 
differed from what the British army were 
accustomed. During the rebellion, much of the 
fighting took place in small skirmishes, raids 
on towns and sieges of cities. The close 
quarters and spontaneous nature of the fighting, 
to which the British were unaccustomed, 
became a form of guerrilla warfare, in 
particular when battles were fought in the re-
taking of major cities and strategic outpost, 
such as at Delhi and Lucknow. The intense 
nature of close-quarters battle led perhaps to 
widespread killing, as soldiers were unsure of 
who was and who wasn’t a rebel. Roberts 
recalls the chaos that ensued once the soldiers 
had entered a town and their intentions 
thereafter, ‘Soldiers get into a town, and cannot 
be expected to distinguish between the guilty 
and innocent in the heat of the moment,’ and as 
Forbes-Mitchell also describes during the siege 
of Lucknow, ‘we found every door and 
window of the palace buildings barricaded, and 
every loop-hole defended by an invisible 
enemy… I need not describe the fight. It raged 
for about two hours from court to court, and 
from room to room.’51 Charles Griffiths too 
paints a frantic picture of the British relief of 
cities, in this case Delhi, ‘From every window 
and door, from loopholes in the buildings, and 
from the tops of the houses, a storm of 
musketry saluted us on every side…’52 The 
nature of guerrilla conflict may have 
aggravated an attitude towards indiscriminate 
killing, as the British may not have taken the 
care to establish a combatant from a non-
combatant in such fraught conditions. This was 
often difficult, and Mukherjee has argued that 
the breakdown of British authority in Kanpur 
once General Wheeler’s force had been 
captured led many of the surrounding residents 
to take up arms and join the mutineers and as a 
result haphazard killing was the British 
approach in response.53  This does not however 
either excuse the actions of the British or 
remove from the fact that much of the killing 
was often fickle, and the literature is filled with 
instances of seemingly unnecessary acts of 
violence by British troops. An example of this 
in Russell’s diary makes for harrowing reading
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as a British Officer, approached by a ‘Kashmir 
boy… leading a blind and aged man, and 
throwing himself at the feet of the officer, 
asked for protection’, the reaction of the 
Officer however was to, ‘draw his revolver’ 
and after his gun failed him thrice, ‘the fourth 
time… the gallant officer succeeded and the 
boy’s life blood flowed at his feet.’54 Kaye also 
records how often non-combatants became 
victims of the British counter-insurgency, in 
this example describing the fate of the native 
inhabitants of Allahabad: “there is no darker 
cloud than that which gathered over Allahabad 
in this terrible summer… the aged, women and 
children, are sacrificed... They were not 
deliberately hanged, but burnt to death in their 
villages.”55 Indiscriminate killing became a 
prevalent element of the British reaction to the 
uprising and can go some way to explaining 
the extent of the fatality rate of non-combatants 
during the conflict. 
 
Infamous characters 
The indiscriminate killing that would become 
such a feature of British aggression during the 
conflict would be exacerbated by the actions of 
those in command of the British troops during 
the counterinsurgency, and one of the most 
poignant aspects of the literature is the infamy 
some of these British commanders would 
achieve amongst both the British army and 
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rebel ranks. Colonel Neill, one of the most 
infamous and severe commanders of the 
British forces in India, would help lead the 
counter-insurgency from the outbreak of the 
Uprising until his death in battle in September 
1857 near Lucknow. General Havelock had a 
high level of contact with Neill and chronicles 
his severity at Allahabad, ‘The disaffected 
portion of the town was burnt, every malignant 
who could be identified was executed, and a 
salutary dread was diffused through the 
neighbouring country,’ and later ‘As the 
column defiled through the town, the natives 
are said to have hastened their doors… the 
remembrance of Colonel Neill’s executions 
effectively prevented any tangible 
demonstration of hatred.’56 Neill’s preceding 
executions on the march to Allahabad in June 
were recounted as being arbitrary, one account 
recording, ‘the old, the young, women and 
children, none were neglected… Every day we 
led expeditions to burn and destroy… day by 
day we have strung up eight or nine men’ and 
another describes at how troops were 
encouraged to engage in ‘peppering away at 
niggers’, which the narrator ‘enjoyed 
amazingly.’57 Neill’s infamous penchant for 
extreme violence spread throughout both the 
British army and rebel camps, and some have 
even suggested that his actions instead of
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producing the intended effect of suppressing 
the rebellion in fact sparked further mutinies in 
reaction to the atrocities he ordered to be 
committed.58 Even from within his own 
regiment did Neill receive criticism, in one 
tragi-comedic account Russell recalls, ‘When 
Neill marched from Allahabad, his executions 
were so numerous and so indiscriminate, that 
one of the officers attached to his column had 
to remonstrate with him on the ground that if 
he depopulated the country he could get no 
supplies for the men.’59 Neill at one point even 
recognises the extent of his actions, ‘Havelock 
left me with sixty-nine sowars who behaved 
badly before the enemy… I would have 
disposed of them otherwise but here they add 
to my weakness.’60 The most frequently 
recorded story of Neill was his punishment of 
prisoners at Cawnpore, who he believed had 
committed the infamous slaughter of European 
women and children. In his letter that was 
printed in The Times, Neill describes his 
actions: 
the chief rebels I make clean up a portion 
of the pool of blood, still two inches deep, 
in the shed where the fearful murder and 
mutilation of women and children took 
place… My object is to inflict a fearful 
punishment for a revolting, cowardly, 
barbarous deed, and to strike terror into 
these rebels. The first I caught was… a 
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high caste Brahmin, who tried to resist my 
order… a few lashes made the miscreant 
accomplish his task. When done, he was 
taken out and immediately hanged, and 
after death buried in a ditch on the 
roadside.61 
 
Neill’s words echo that of General Dyer’s 
description of ‘sufficient moral effect’ in 1919. 
Accounts of this event do vary in their detail: 
Forbes-Mitchell recalls that prisoners were 
made to ‘crouch down, and with their mouths 
lick clean a square foot of the blood soaked 
floor before being taken to the gallows and 
hanged’ and in Kaye’s secondary account of 
General Neill he also concurs that licking the 
blood of the massacred Europeans was 
included in the punishment ritual.62 Not only 
did Neill confine the limits of his wrath to his 
own regiment’s handiwork, but ordered others 
to proceed in the same manner. His orders to 
Major Renaud for the march his Cawnpore are 
telling:  
4th: All Sepoys found, without papers, 
from regiments that have mutinied… to be 
hanged forthwith… also all of the Sepoys 
of the 6th and 37th Regiments not on 
passport. Futtehpore to be promptly 
attacked, the Patan quarters to be 
destroyed, all in it killed, in fact, make an 
example of this place. 
 
7th: The object in attacking villages and 
Futtehpore is to execute vengeance, and let
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it amply be taken… If the Deputy 
Collector is taken, hang him, and have his 
head cut off and stuck up on one of the 
principal buildings (Mahomedan) in the 
town.63 
 
It is evident that by ordering actions such 
as displaying the decapitated head of a leading 
town figure and letting ‘vengeance’ be ‘amply 
taken,’ Neill wishes to demonstrate the full 
extent of colonial might. Russell’s diary 
records the aftermath of Renaud’s march from 
Allahabad, describing Renaud as ‘emulous of 
Neill’ and ‘executions of the natives in the line 
of the march were indiscriminate to the last 
degree… In two days forty-two men were 
hanged on the roadside, and a batch of twelve 
men were executed because their faces were 
‘turned the wrong way’ when they were met on 
the march.’64 The ‘exhibition of stern justice’65, 
as Kaye conservatively describes it, was an 
instrument employed by a number of the higher 
command who would achieve a similar cult 
status. In another example a British officer, 
Reginald Wilberforce, is quite taken with a 
certain General Nicholson, so famed for his 
love of the noose when dealing with natives 
that one conversation between two soldiers 
reads: “Jack the General’s here”; “How do you 
know?”; “Why look over there; there’s his 
mark”, as it turns out, what the soldier was 
asked to look at was a set of gallows, each full 
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with a set of six hanging rebels.66 Nicholson’s 
attitude to indiscriminate killing is also 
showcased by Wilberforce, who records, ‘Few 
courts-martial were held by Nicholson; his 
dictum, ‘The punishment of mutiny is death’, 
obviated any necessity for trials.’67 It is clear 
that a recurrent element of commanders’ orders 
during the Uprising usually centred around the 
idea of no mercy for natives and instead hang 
or shoot most on suspicion to make an example 
and facilitate the counterinsurgency. This also 
leads to the idea that of those caught few were 
ever given the option to prove their innocence, 
if it would have been believed in the first place. 
 
Treatment of prisoners and ‘No Quarter’ 
The infamy of the British commanders during 
the Uprising and their clear intentions to meet 
the Indian threat with their own brand of 
ferocity lent itself to a policy of ‘no mercy’ for 
prisoners. Wilberforce provides a bleak 
anecdote of this when he describes the conflict 
as, ‘no civilized war’ and thus, ‘no quarter was 
ever asked for, even if it had been it never 
would have been given.’68 Another episode 
recounts how the prisoners were disposed of on 
grounds of efficiency: 
Just before we got to Lahore, a native 
regiment broke away… he caught up with 
them some 125 miles away… The officer
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was in a dilemma: he could not let the 
Sepoys escape… managed to march them 
into a building, and when night came on, 
he stuffed up all the air-holes, so that in 
the morning, when the doors opened there 
was no one to come out.69 
 
This account is also recorded by one 
Frederick Cooper who has a slightly different 
telling, recalling that some in the room did 
survive, however, ‘They were taken out next 
day and shot, in batches of ten.’70 Cooper also 
registers that these were prisoners who had 
taken no part in the mutiny, being disarmed 
beforehand.71 Roberts is also ruthless when 
dealing with suspects, ‘When a prisoner is 
brought in, I am the first to call out to have him 
hanged, knowing that unless the severest 
measures are adopted we shall have no end to 
our war.’72 Thomas Lowe further exemplifies 
this trend in his memoirs, as he warns of the 
risk associated with leaving potential rebels 
alive, ‘to spare the rebel whose hands were 
raised in supplication, was to receive a bullet in 
the back, an instant after mercy had stayed the 
avenging arm.’73 Thus in Lowe’s experience 
the general practice was prisoners being, 
‘ranged in one long line and blindfolded… a 
long rattle of musketry swept this fleshy wall 
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of miscreants from their earthly existence.’74 
The general pervading attitude of the British 
troops seemed to be that of such a brutal 
conflict called for equally brutal measures to be 
taken. As the Roberts excerpt demonstrates, 
there was possibly a belief that by killing 
prisoners and demonstrating ‘severest 
measures’, the rebellion could effectively be 
subdued. 
As the primary material has demonstrated, 
there was throughout the suppression of the 
1857 rebellion the sense that an escalated level 
of violence must be forced upon the Indians in 
order to stamp out the rebellion. This led to a 
public demonstration of executions as well as 
the prevalence of indiscriminate killing and no 
mercy being given to prisoners. The infamy 
that some of the British higher command 
achieved throughout the Uprising was in direct 
relation to the severity of their approach to the 
counterinsurgency, and in the case of some this 
would be embodied by a clear tactic of 
shooting first and asking questions later. The 
tactical use of ‘shock and awe’ was widespread 
during the counterinsurgency and some could 
argue that its use was devastatingly effective, 
as the rebellion was suppressed within a fairly 
short amount of time in comparison to its 
expanse. The violence of 1857 however was 
not committed without motivation by the 
soldiers who carried it out and the commanders
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who ordered its instigation. It is to these 
motivations that we must now direct our 
examination in order to further explore the 
question as to whether the British can 
conceivably be accused of genocide during the 
Uprising. 
 
Motivations – Racism, Religion, Revenge 
and Chaos 
The extensive nature of colonial violence in 
India during the Uprising was a stark feature of 
the counterinsurgency and was evidently 
encouraged by the higher powers of the British 
army, whilst also being endorsed by a public 
and media back in Britain. As Indian historian 
Sabyasachi Battacharya has argued, whereas 
the Europeans who died at the hands of the 
Indians were often the victims of the violence 
of a leaderless mob, the cruelty that the British 
inflicted on the Indians came from an army, 
choosing to behave like a mob.75 What is 
important henceforth is to establish the reasons 
that motivated the British to behave in this 
way, as this can help the debate illuminate the 
question as to whether the response took on the 
form of colonial genocide, testing as to 
whether there are grounds for the application of 
the term due to the existence of a dolus 
specialis in the manner of the British 
campaign.  
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Racial motivations 
Considering the language of the soldiers’ 
accounts in the sources, there are clear 
elements of pervading racial prejudice. Indians 
are frequently referred to as ‘niggers’, or as 
Lowe describes them, ‘a debased race’ and 
‘unscrupulous liars’.76 In Russell’s diary even 
the treatment of those loyal to the British was 
racist, one incident recalling how he witnessed 
the ‘licking’, or beating, of ‘So-and-So’s 
servants’, describing it as ‘a savage, beastly 
and degrading custom.’77 Another occurrence 
in Russell’s diary recounts a time when he saw 
idle Indians being attacked by what he 
described as ‘a great British lion with his eyes 
flashing fire… a huge stick in his fist,’ who 
decides to, ‘rush among the coolies’ and beat 
them until they were left ‘maimed and 
bleeding’. When Russell confronts him, the 
soldier responds ‘those lazy scoundrels are 
engaged to do our work, and they sneak off 
whenever they can.’78 There was certainly a 
widespread British attitude towards the Indians 
as a disloyal, lazy and inferior race, consistent 
with the growth of white supremacist ideas that 
had permeated throughout Europe in the 
nineteenth century. The Indians are also 
frequently dehumanised by the British, 
something that Joanna Bourke argues is an
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essential component of facilitating the killing 
of the enemy.79 It is in wartime environments 
Bourke emphasises that with the establishment 
of the idea of an inferior race, and in theatres of 
war where the battle is fought between two 
different ethnicities, atrocities and massacres 
are more likely to occur.80 The description of 
the Indians as ‘wild beasts’ helps to negate 
them the qualities of human beings and 
therefore the killing and spread of terror is 
perhaps easier rationalised by the British. 81 
The British were quick to establish themselves 
as the superior race in their minds, possibly in 
order to make allowances for their actions. 
Private Metcalfe’s statement, ‘we were soldiers 
– they were fiends’, and an anecdote in The 
Times, ‘they were literally torn asunder by the 
laughing fiends,’ demonstrates how the British 
to separated themselves from the Indians in the 
theatre of war.82 The idea of a soldier 
classically denoted conduct and bravery, and 
by casting the Indians as ‘fiends’ it denied 
them these qualities. This sense of ‘other’ 
arguably emboldens the British with a sense of 
duty to purge the savage races for their 
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wrongdoing, as demonstrated by Wilberforce’s 
who, ‘can’t wait to get a slap at these niggers’ 
for what they had done to insult the Empire.83  
Racial prejudices are therefore clear throughout 
the Uprising, however one could also argue 
that this was a consequential and not causative 
factor in the escalation of violence. It is evident 
that the soldiers establish a sense of ‘us’ and 
‘them’, however this is perhaps a natural 
consequence of war in such an environment, 
and whereabouts race facilitated the violence 
of warfare it did not explicitly cause it.  
 
Religious motivations 
If race was possibly a facilitator but not a 
causative factor, another similar motivation 
that must be explored was the role of religion. 
It is difficult to argue that the Uprising was not 
a conflict dominated by religion. As Mukerhjee 
has asserted, the conflict ‘displayed a very 
strong religious fervour’, this also emphasised 
by S. Malik who argued that the interpretations 
of 1857 in British accounts have often taken on 
a form of Anglican evangelistic zeal.84 There 
is, from the primary material, a clear sense that 
to some this was a war of the civilising forces 
of Christianity against the heathens of India, 
and it was army’s job to act as a ‘military
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wing’ of ‘holy warriors’ and to civilise the 
country.85 General Neill’s actions at Cawnpore 
for example, display clear religious 
motivations to defile the Indians as they are 
forced to lick the blood from the floor of the 
house in which European women and children 
were slaughtered, automatically betraying their 
caste, and Neill also states after the punishment 
ritual how he, ‘cannot help seeing that His 
finger is in all of this’86 Edwardes even 
contends how Neill’s actions there were driven 
by ‘Evangelical fury’ as he laid down 
punishment, ‘smugly quoting Holy Writ as a 
justification for the abominable tortures.’87 Sir 
Colin Campbell goes further in his memoirs, 
arguing that, ‘Neill did things more than the 
massacre… He seems to have affected a 
religious call to blood.’88 Amongst the British 
non-combatants there also existed the idea of 
British superiority due to religion and the 
penalty that would be paid for taking a 
Christian life, demonstrated by Miss Haldane 
to an Indian trying to help her in her escape 
from Delhi, as she remonstrates to this 
particular native, ‘for every European or 
Christian life they would pay back tenfold, and 
that if we were killed, our four lives would lie 
at this door and he would pay for them.’89  
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The role of religion was also important 
regarding punishments of suspected rebels, as 
accounts detail how the British were ‘sewing 
Mohammedans in pig-skins, smearing them 
with pork-fat before execution,’ these actions 
again religiously humiliating and defiling the 
Indians.90 The idea of religion as means of 
establishing difference and superiority would 
infiltrate far through the ranks of the British 
army throughout the conflict and Edwardes 
sees many of the British soldiers as having 
believed that this was a war between 
Christianity and the Hindu and Islamic 
religions, which further facilitated the 
violence.91 Some of the primary material 
accounts for a millenarian nature to the 
conflict, for example Russell’s tale of a soldier 
who implies ‘a miraculous interposition had 
diverted the infidel missile’, referring to a 
church cross that hadn’t been shot through by 
Indian bullets but the metal ball below it had; 
in fact, as Russell states, ‘the cross was solid 
whilst it was evident the ball was hollow.’92 
Forbes-Mitchell also records how one 
particular soldier, known as Quaker Wallace, 
strode into battle whilst reciting the 116th 
Psalm: 
I love, the Lord, because my voice and 
prayers, He die hear. I, while I live, will 
call on Him, Who bow’d to me his ear  
 
Then furthermore this soldier,
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plunged into the Secundrabâgh quoting the 
next verse at every shot fired from his rifle 
and at each thrust given by his 
bayonet: I’ll of salvation take the cup, On 
God’s name will call; I’ll pay my vows 
now to the Lord Before His people all.93 
  
Incidents such as these demonstrate that 
for some of the British soldiery there was an 
element of evangelical zeal in the way they 
went about the suppression. On the other hand 
one could also argue that this was a natural 
response in times of war against another 
religion and a heightened sense of Christian 
duty was nothing untoward. Britain at the time 
was a frivolously Christian country, and it has 
been suggested that this religious fervour was 
exaggerated even more so during the Uprising 
than in India.94 There are other instances where 
the role of religion clearly did motivate some 
to carry out certain actions. Wilberforce elicits 
how, ‘my great desire was to get a shell 
inside… that great Mosque… some one found 
the correct elevation… then we sent shell after 
shell into the great Mosque.’95 It seems fairly 
futile to exact punishment on a religious 
building just for the sake of destroying it, 
considering it is unlikely that there were any 
rebels inside and it was a clear waste of British 
ammunition. It is possible that the destruction 
of the Mosque provided Wilberforce with a 
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sense of gratification for having attacked one 
of the most distinct symbols of Islam. This 
therefore can suggest that the religious 
motivations of some soldiers were significant, 
but can this really afford the suggestion that the 
killing took place due to the aspect of religion? 
Instead perhaps religion provided a clear 
distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that was feasibly 
natural in such an environment, especially one 
where the religious element of the conflict was 
so prevalent. This however was again, as this 
discussion lent to racial motivation, a reflection 
of the nature of the conflict rather than a 
motivation for widespread and indiscriminate 
killing. 
 
Vengeance and chaos 
If racial and religious elements were perhaps 
not causative factors in creating the level of 
violence and indiscriminate killing witnessed 
during the British counterinsurgency of 1857, 
then one must explore other possible 
motivations that brought this about. Vengeance 
has been another motivation cited for the 
extents to which British soldiers and 
commanders went to exact punishment upon 
the Indians for the rebels’ atrocities. Events 
such as those at Cawnpore were vividly 
described, often mythologised and exaggerated 
throughout the British camps and led to 
reprisals being severe. Forbes-Mitchell recalls 
the urgency to exact revenge, ‘the throats of 
our men were hoarse with shouting,
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“Cawnpore! You bloody murderers!” This was 
also encouraged by the higher command, Sir 
Colin Campbell exclaiming to the 93rd 
Regiment post-battle, ‘you have bravely done 
your share of this morning’s work, and 
Cawnpore is avenged!’96 As Edwardes argues, 
the massacre at Cawnpore released the British 
soldiers onto a bloodthirsty rampage that took 
on the form of a ‘retributive savagery’ 
whenever they had the opportunity to exercise 
revenge.97The British media would provide 
impetus for soldier’s actions, urging the 
harshest treatment of the natives and scolding 
the government for thinking otherwise. One 
report warns, “Can there really be a policy 
more suicidal than when the whole country is 
swarming with rebels… for a Government to 
exhibit itself as afraid to act with severity.”98 
Such barbaric activity, such as the killing of 
European women and children, would 
therefore justify, for the British, a martial 
response, and it has been suggested that in 
times of war justification can be important for 
an escalation of violence, as due to its 
instrumental nature it requires a perceived end 
to justify its means.99 What one must consider 
however is that the use of Indian atrocities, 
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namely those at Cawnpore, as motivating 
factors for wanton colonial violence, is 
possibly a limited argument as in fact much of 
the British killing also occurred prior to 
confirmed knowledge of the event.100 The 
butcher of the Indians at Cawnpore, Neill, even 
initially dismissed the story as a fable and the 
full truth of the massacre was not properly 
confirmed until the British re-entered the city 
and discovered the scene of the event.101 The 
idea of revenge therefore, though perhaps 
playing a part in the later stages of the 
Uprising, was an unlikely motivation for the 
slaughter of Indian civilians that was carried 
out in the earlier stages. 
In light of the fact that revenge is unlikely 
to have been a significant factor driving the 
British troops to commit atrocities throughout 
the majority of the violent episodes of the 
counterinsurgency, perhaps a more analytical 
explanation stems from the chaotic nature of 
the reaction to the rebellion by the British and 
the breakdown in order throughout the army. 
Looting and plunder are highlighted in the 
literature as features of the suppression, in 
particular during the British recapture of cities. 
The violent environment that looting and 
plunder created could therefore have assisted 
the prevalent nature of widespread killing. 
Roberts remembers how in the relief of
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captured Delhi looting and plundering was 
rampant, ‘our men now sack and destroy all the 
Native ones [houses]’ and how the soldiers 
engaged in ‘killing every man we came 
across… Everybody was turned out of the city, 
and all the houses were plundered.’102 The 
breakdown in order was seemingly well 
beyond the authority of the officers, as Charles 
Griffiths records, despite there being strict 
orders in Delhi not to loot, ‘it was impossible 
to check the evil.’103 The result of this level of 
frenzied attack on the rebels and occupiers of 
Delhi had dire consequences, as soldiers 
‘brooked no interference when in the act of 
securing booty,’ which led to widespread 
slaughter, Roberts describing the scene in 
Delhi where, ‘In one pit upwards of 500 bodies 
were thrown… nearly 2000 Pandies were on 
the ground dead or dying.’104 Alcohol also 
often fuelled the British attacks on rebel-held 
cities or towns, to such an extent that it’s 
seizure was ordered to be controlled by 
Havelock, ‘I have ordered all the beer, wine, 
spirits and every drinkable thing at Cawnpore 
to be purchased by the Commissariat… it will 
be guarded by a few good men; if it remained 
at Cawnpore… I should not have a sober 
                                                 
102 F. Roberts, Letters Written during the Indian Mutiny, 
pp.60-68 
103 C. Griffiths, A Narrative of the Siege of Delhi, p.197 
104 C. Griffiths, A Narrative of the Siege of Delhi, p.197; 
F. Roberts, Letters Written during the Indian Mutiny, 
p.103 
soldier in camp.’105 Roberts also emphasises 
the level to which the drunkenness effected the 
soldiers, ‘All the old Officers were completely 
at their wits’ ends… the shops with beer and 
brandy had all been left open, and several of 
our men got drunk, others could not find their 
regiments.’106 The pervasion of insobriety 
throughout the army was commonplace and 
can go some way to explaining the particularly 
disordered nature of British relief efforts that 
often ended in wanton plunder. Havelock 
provides what he believes are the reasons for 
the level of looting that occurred, citing that 
soldiers were ‘exasperated beyond bounds by 
the perfidious and brutal massacre of their 
fellow countrymen and women, and they 
considered the plunder of the town in which 
these atrocities had been perpetrated as an act 
of righteous retribution.’107 This is perhaps 
somewhat facetious however as why the 
British troops would have believed that 
plundering European shops and Indian homes, 
which would have offered them little following 
the lengthy siege of the town, would deliver 
vengeance for the deaths of Europeans, is 
questionable. Nonetheless, it is evident that the 
British efforts to recapture cities did lead to 
plunder and high levels of uncontrolled
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violence on the part of British troops, and can 
go some way to explaining the levels of Indian 
casualties. The unprofessional nature of the 
British troops would be further compelled by 
the guerrilla nature of battles throughout the 
Uprising, and as Griffiths describes from his 
experiences in Delhi, ‘There is nothing so 
destructive of the morale and discipline of 
soldiers as street-fighting.’108 The panic created 
by this intense and close quarters sort of 
combat, fought in cities where it was not clear 
who was an insurgent and who wasn’t, could 
have led to a motive for widespread 
slaughter.109 
When searching for motivations to explain 
the level of violence that the counterinsurgency 
experienced therefore, if one is to rest their 
case with racial or religious prejudices this 
would perhaps be a short-sighted explanation 
as they were arguably products of the natural 
divisions in a war that was fought between two 
different races and contained strong religious 
elements, and not causative factors. Their 
exaggeration during the war would be, as 
Donald Bloxham has argued, a case of the 
‘motions of battle’ fuelling ‘the emotions that 
would sustain them.’110 Motivations were 
perhaps instead not pre-meditated or 
prejudicial, but the outcome of a breakdown in 
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professional conduct of the army faced with a 
new mode of conflict, coupled with an 
overriding order to deliver a significant 
demoralising blow to the rebellion through 
widespread and indiscriminate violence. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to examine the notion 
that the British reaction to the Indian Uprising 
became something of a colonial genocide. A 
theoretical discussion of the forms of British 
colonial authority has provided us with a 
general understanding of the suppressive nature 
of colonial rule and following this a study of 
the letters, journals and anecdotes of soldiers 
and non-combatants during the conflict has 
both illuminated the methods and practices of 
the counterinsurgency as well as helped 
construct an analysis of the possible 
motivations of the British in employing such 
widespread violent campaign. This conclusion 
shall intend to draw together the arguments and 
findings from the preceding discussion and 
attempt to gauge whether an accusation of 
colonial genocide is warranted, or whether 
there are other, and perhaps more accurate, 
ways of characterising the colonial violence 
throughout the Uprising. 
The first part of this paper, that explored 
the methods by which colonial authority was 
expressed, should therefore provide little shock 
when considering the coercive approach to 
suppressing the rebellion that the British
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decided upon in 1857. Retribution for 
challenges to colonial authority were 
historically both a martial and visual affair, and 
this would furthermore be embodied within the 
‘shock and awe’ tactic that the British 
employed in order to crush the rebellion in 
1857. This tactic arguably contributed to the 
swift escalation of coercion, as its foundational 
nature was to heighten the level of violence to 
a point that would produce a sufficiently 
demoralising effect. As demonstrated in the 
empirical analysis, the British Army’s higher 
command implemented this tactic by ordering 
capital executions on a vast scale as well as 
encouraging a policy of widespread slaughter 
on marches and raids on towns and villages. 
The British had a firm policy of taking no 
prisoners and often embarked on indiscriminate 
killing sprees that targeted non-combatants as 
well as rebels, going well beyond the bounds of 
the battlefield. The battlefield itself was also 
often unclear during the Uprising, in particular 
in the case of the relief of cities where guerrilla 
warfare challenged the British with a type of 
conflict with which they were entirely 
uncomfortable. Having established the great 
degree of arbitrary killing during the 1857 
counterinsurgency and the conditions that 
allowed this to occur, motives for the extent of 
the colonial violence are thereby the means by 
which an accusation of genocide can be tried. 
When considering the motivations that 
exacerbated the level of killing that was 
implemented by the British during 1857, one is 
nonetheless tempted to employ the premise that 
it was racially and/or religiously conceived, as 
there were clear racial prejudices and a 
quantity of religious fundamentalism 
throughout the Uprising. However one must 
also be careful to note that these were possibly 
not the causal factors that drove on the colonial 
violence, but instead the consequential 
elements of a wartime environment where the 
conflict was fought between two different 
creeds and two opposing religions. Whilst 
racial prejudice was demonstrated by the 
British troops, and there were instances where 
Christianity seems to have driven forward the 
suppressive efforts, this is more than likely a 
product of the war itself rather than a catalyst 
for slaughter. Vengeance too can be confused 
with a causative factor, as some have argued 
that the extent of British colonial violence lent 
itself to a blood lust to avenge the deaths of 
European non-combatants. However as the 
preceding discussion has asserted, many of the 
most violent episodes of colonial suppression 
in fact occurred before knowledge of events 
such as Cawnpore were confirmed, and in the 
earlier stages of the counterinsurgency, 
therefore one could arguably discount this 
theory. 
If one can possibly disregard racial and 
religious prejudices as non-causative and 
vengeance as inconsistent with the chronology 
of the Uprising, the dolus specialis that one
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searches for when trying to examine what 
Amaresh Misra has famously described as 
colonial genocide by the British in 1857, was 
perhaps instead a partially abstract motive after 
all.111 The British did arguably embark on a 
campaign of wanton slaughter, however its 
foundations were based upon the premises of 
massacre, not genocide, and motivated by the 
belief that a significant level of physical 
violence could ‘shock and awe’ the rebellion 
out of India. The abstract, or indirect, elements 
that would intensify this to the point that it was 
almost uncontrollable were the frantic response 
to guerrilla warfare that saw a widespread 
martial reaction directed at the Indian 
population, as in these conditions anyone could 
conceivably be a rebel in the colonials’ eyes, 
and a breakdown in the order of the army. This 
collapse of professionalism occurred 
particularly in the relief of cities, which is 
where the concentration of guerrilla fighting 
occurred, also as a result of drunkenness 
throughout the British regiments and a clear 
desire to loot and plunder. Therefore the  
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existence of ‘special intent’ is absent in the 
case of the British suppression, as the intent is 
only partial i.e. the order to implement ‘shock 
and awe’, which was not racially or religiously 
conceived, but a military tactic. Thus a 
campaign marred with the committing of many 
a massacre, instead of genocide, is perhaps a 
more accurate way of characterising British 
colonial violence during the Uprising. This 
conclusion has not in any way tried to excuse 
the actions of the British, or remove from the 
fact that the counterinsurgency was extensively 
severe, however to wrongly accuse an event of 
genocide is to further contribute to an overuse 
of the term and the dilution of its meaning, as 
well as do an injustice to historical incidents 
where this term rightfully applies. Thus in the 
case of 1857, the British counterinsurgency 
must be understood as the tactical implication 
of massacre on an extensive scale in India in 
order to suppress the rebellion, alongside a 
chaotic and violent military campaign that 
spiralled out of control, but arguably cannot be 
viewed as colonial genocide.
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